

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

9 December 1956

25X1

Copy No. 112

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

43
DOCUMENT NO. ~~43~~
NO CHANGE IN CLASS.
 DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: 2019
AUTH: HR 70-2
DATE: 2/Dec/79 REVIEWER:

OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

25X1

DIA and DOS review(s) completed.

~~TOP SECRET~~

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

CONTENTS

1. HUNGARIAN REGIME DECLARES MARTIAL LAW TO
COMBAT WORKERS

25X1

2. JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF SEES NO AGGRESSIVE
ISRAELI DESIGN AT PRESENT

25X1

3. YUGOSLAV ATTITUDE TOWARD HUNGARY

25X1

25X1

25X1

7. CHINESE COMMUNIST RAILWAY OPPOSITE TAIWAN COM-
PLETED

8. LIBERIAN PRESIDENT SEEKS AUTHORIZATION FOR DIPLO-
MATIC RELATIONS WITH COMMUNISTS

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

1. HUNGARIAN REGIME DECLARES MARTIAL LAW TO COMBAT WORKERS

25X1

Warned by the workers that its policies could lead to renewed fighting and another "national tragedy," the Hungarian regime on 9 December declared a state of martial law throughout the country. Simultaneously, it ordered the dissolution of the Central Budapest Workers' Council--the leading force of the opposition--and all district workers' councils, which allegedly have engaged in "counterrevolutionary" activities. The regime also ordered all citizens owning "unlicensed arms" to surrender them to police authorities by the evening of 11 December or face "summary jurisdiction."

These drastic moves will probably lead to new outbreaks of violence and fresh waves of refugees. This in turn might lead to the dismissal of Premier Kadar and a severe tightening of Soviet control over the Hungarian government and people. The Kadar regime has met with a succession of failures in its five-week attempt to restore civil and economic order; its authority is based almost entirely on the presence of Soviet troops.

The workers' councils, on the other hand, apparently have the support of the vast majority of the general population. Virtually all production workers except those in certain public service industries will probably go on strike. According to press sources, the Central Workers' Council of Budapest had issued a call for a 48-hour general strike on

9 Dec 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 3

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

8 December, even before the government decreed martial law, in protest over the arrests of council representatives, workers, students and intellectuals.

Normal telecommunication contact between Budapest and the West was severed, presumably by the regime, during the morning (Budapest time) of 9 December.

25X1

9 Dec 56

Current Intelligence Bulletin

Page 4

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

25X1

2. JORDANIAN CHIEF OF STAFF SEES NO AGGRESSIVE
ISRAELI DESIGN AT PRESENT

25X1

Jordanian chief of staff Nuwar told a UN truce officer on 3 December he does not believe Israel has aggressive designs on Jordan at present. Nuwar said he does believe there is a scheme afoot "to put pressure on Syria," but he appears to have a generally relaxed attitude.

25X1

[redacted] are making daily inspections of the Israeli frontier opposite Syria and similar tours every other day of the frontier opposite Jordan, and that these inspections continue to indicate there are no unusual Israeli troop concentrations in the area.

The American army attaché in Tel Aviv now estimates Israeli active strength at 80,000, including paramilitary units. This is approximately the normal level at which Israel maintained its active duty force prior to the mobilization for the attack on Egypt.

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

25X1

3. YUGOSLAV ATTITUDE TOWARD HUNGARY

25X1

In a conversation with Western ambassadors on 5 December, Tito said he was in the midst of negotiations with the Soviet Union on Hungary and asked for more faith in Yugoslav policy. Tito advised the West to keep hands off at this time because Western efforts to help would only be harmful.

Tito said that the Hungarians were being punished for having defeated the Soviet army. The Soviet leaders had a real fear of war, particularly after the rebels had demonstrated their power. Under these circumstances the Yugoslavs could not have supported a solution involving Hungarian neutrality. He added that the Yugoslavs would continue to support greater liberty for the Hungarians, but that "socialism" must be preserved.

On 7 December, Yugoslav vice president Kardelj told the National Assembly that Yugoslavia had accepted the second Soviet intervention in the hope that it would lead to a Hungarian regime, including Nagy elements, attuned to the desires of the working masses. Such an orientation, he said, could have been accomplished through the workers' councils, which represented true socialist tendencies. He said the Kadar government had displayed other tendencies, as illustrated by the violation of the agreement on Nagy, and he clearly implied that the Yugoslavs might eventually drop all support for Kadar as well as their acquiescence in the Soviet intervention.

Comment

Belgrade apparently intended the withdrawal of its ambassador to Budapest to put pressure on the Soviet Union over Hungary, and it is continuing the exchange of notes with the Kadar government over the Nagy abduction.

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

**7. CHINESE COMMUNIST RAILWAY OPPOSITE
TAIWAN COMPLETED**

25X1

Tracklaying on the railway running across Fukien Province to the coastal port of Amoy opposite Taiwan was completed on 7 December, according to a Peiping announcement. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] The railway will probably not be in full operation, however, until some time early next year.

25X1

25X1

25X1

The line will greatly increase the Chinese Communists' capability to deliver military supplies to the Taiwan Straits area. Completion of the railroad also enhances the value of Amoy as a commercial port, but use of the harbor by merchant vessels would require the neutralization of Nationalist artillery positions on Quemoy and Little Quemoy Islands. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3

8. LIBERIAN PRESIDENT SEEKS AUTHORIZATION FOR DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH COMMUNISTS

25X1

[Redacted]

President Tubman, in his annual message to the Liberian legislature on 30 November, recommended authorization for the progressive establishment, "as resources permit," of diplomatic relations with a number of countries, including the USSR and Communist China. Tubman indicated that financial problems arising from Liberia's development program would not permit the opening of all the new diplomatic posts at once, "not even in the immediate future."

Tubman subsequently informed the American embassy that he did not want the Communists in Liberia and that he will proceed carefully. The embassy believes Tubman will not exchange missions with the USSR in the near future.

Comment

In a joint communique with the USSR last January, Tubman agreed in principle to an exchange of diplomatic representatives subject to the legislature's approval and appropriation of the necessary funds. Although Tubman apparently still hopes to defer indefinitely the actual establishment of diplomatic ties, he will probably be under increasing pressure to complete the arrangements, especially if the Gold Coast, Liberia's chief rival for prestige in West Africa, enters into formal relations with the USSR after it gains independence next March.

Approved For Release 2002/08/06 : CIA-RDP79T00975A002800430001-3